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THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT "PUNISHMENT" CLAUSE
AFTER HELLING v. McKINNEY: FOUR TERMS, TWO
STANDARDS, AND A SEARCH FOR DEFINITION
"To-day we have naming of parts."1
INTRODUCTION
Among the many broad yet rudimentary directives of our Consti-
tution,2 few have defied definition more consistently than the "pun-
ishment" clause of the Eighth Amendment.' As of early 1994, Su-
preme Court justices have recited the six words "nor cruel and
unusual punishment inflicted" in no less than 120 opinions.4 Yet
throughout this lode of case law, simple definitions of these words,
much less a lasting construction of the.clause as a whole, have been
elusive, evaded, and sometimes explicitly refused.5 Even where basic
definitions can be inferred from the Court's opinions, the adjectives
"cruel" and "unusual" tend to be reduced to synonyms of the same
amorphous sort: "cruel" becomes "wanton" or "deliberately indif-
ferent;"' "unusual" transforms to "unreasonable," "unnecessary" or
1. Henry Reed, Naming of Parts in COLLECTED POEMS 49 (John Stallworthy ed., 1991)
(describing the didactic dissection of a rifle). Here is the first stanza:
To-day we have naming of parts. Yesterday,
We had daily cleaning. And to-morrow morning,
We shall have what to do after firing. But to-day,
To-day we have naming of parts. Japonica
Glistens like coral in all of the neighbouring gardens,
And to-day we have naming of parts.
Id.
2. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 93-94 (1993) ("[T]he text of
the Constitution is often extremely vague . . . .On so many of the central constitutional ques-
tions, the words of the Constitution tell us much less than we need to know.").
3. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST., amend. VIII.
4. This includes both majority and non-majority opinions in which the clause is more than
incidentally mentioned. The words "cruel and unusual punishment," have appeared, without ex-
tensive discussion, in over 2500 cases and certiorari decisions. Search of WESTLAW, SCT &
SCT OLD libraries (Sept. 23, 1994).
5. While this article primarily considers the elusiveness of punishment clause definitions, it also
notes how a number of cases have completely evaded any discussion on particular meanings of the
clause and how some cases have explicitly refused to separate the terms.
6. See infra notes 248-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's various in-
terpretations of "cruel").
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"serious." ' 7 In direct analysis, the Court has given surprisingly little
explicit attention to the verb "inflicted" or to the object "punish-
ment"" and practically no reference to the clause's passive voice and
lack of a receiver. 9
Instead of considering the clause by its components, the Court has
typically confined the terms to extratextual "standards," applying
"contemporary standards of decency" and subjective and objective
standards of proof.10 Recently however, the Court has carefully
shaped these standards in such a way that an aggrieved claimant
has a fairly clear understanding of what to plead; never having to
specifically address whether an occurrence qualifies as an "inflic-
tion," or as something that is "cruel," "unusual" or even
"punishment."1
During the Bill of Rights' adoption process, delegates voiced con-
cern that the terms of the Eighth Amendment's third clause were
too difficult to define and that this would one day render the clause
meaningless. 2 In Helling v. McKinney,' the Supreme Court's most
recent assessment of the clause, a seven justice majority chose not to
expressly consider what constituted "punishment," and instead ap-
plied formalized standards of objective and subjective review.' In
response, the dissent expressed a concern that "punishment" no
longer meant what it "always meant."' 5 Neither the majority nor
the dissent took time to define the words "cruel," "unusual" or "in-
flicted." Although it is unlikely that the punishment clause or any of
its terms will become absolutely meaningless, the Helling majority's
exclusive attention to standards and the dissent's concern with a sin-
gular definition raise a time worn question: exactly what meaning
should be attached to the punishment clause and its terms?
7. See infra notes 258-65, 294-95 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's various in-
terpretations of "unusual").
8. See infra notes 266-77, 292-93 and accompanying text (discussing the meanings occasion-
ally assigned to "punishment" and "inflicted").
9. See infra notes 282-91 and accompanying text (discussing the punishment clause's scopeas
to the proscription of whose punishment upon whom).
10. See infra notes 90-167 and accompanying text (reviewing the development of these
standards).
11. See infra notes 361-71 and accompanying text (explaining the dual standard test as articu-
lated in Helling v. McKinney).
12. See infra notes 19-29 and accompanying text (briefly noting the legislative history of the
clause).
13. 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993).
14. Id. at 2475-82.
15. Id. at 2483 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Part I of this article, by focusing on the history and evolution of
Supreme Court case law, considers the various interpretations of the
punishment clause, including the occasional definitions of its terms,
explanations of its standards, and constructions of the clause as a
whole.1 6 After presenting the spectrum of past Supreme Court inter-
pretations, Part I directs special attention to the latest conflicting
interpretations in Helling v. McKinney.17
Part II analyzes the range and multiple dimensions of past and
present Supreme Court interpretations.18 Finally, Part III concludes
that there can be no rigid definitions of the individual words and
standards of the punishment clause; that the pervasive lack of static
is perhaps as it should be; and that the whole of the words "nor
cruel and unusual punishment inflicted" should and likely always
will stand greater than terse meanings of its parts.
I. BACKGROUND
Before appraising the Supreme Court's current understanding of
the Eighth Amendment punishment clause, the manner in which the
Court has construed the clause over the years must be considered.
The initial section of this article traces the history of the punish-
ment clause from its origins through over two-hundred years of case
law, concentrating especially on the Court's development of term
definitions, standards of application, and general clause
interpretations.
A. Origins of the Clause
Before the Eighth Amendment's existence, early governments ex-
ercised a practically unchecked power to punish. 9 This power even-
tually prompted calls for protection by Massachusetts Bay colonists
who declared in 1641: "For bodilie [sic] punishments we allow
16. See infra notes 30-167 and accompanying text (reviewing the history of Supreme Court
interpretations of the punishment clause).
17. See infra notes 168-238 and accompanying text (summarizing the majority and dissenting
opinions in Helling v. McKinney).
18. See infra notes 239-354 and accompanying text (discussing the dimensions of term mean-
ings, standards of review, and overall interpretations) and notes 355-88 and accompanying text
(observing the appearance of these dimensions in Helling).
19. See generally THURSTON GREENE, THE LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION 617-55 (1991)
(tracing the documentary usage of the word "punishment" before its incorporation in the Eighth
Amendment, beginning with the power bestowed on Christopher Columbus in 1492 to punish civil
and criminal offenders in the Western Hemisphere).
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amongst us none that are inhumane, Barbarous or cruel."20 In 1689,
the English Bill of Rights declared that "cruel and unusual punish-
ments [ought not to be] inflicted." 21 After gaining independence,
many colonists initially adopted this permissive version of the clause
in their earliest state constitutions. 2 In several instances, however,
they converted "ought not" into "shall not."2
At the national level, early federal legislators proposed the clause
in its mandatory form as part of the Constitution's Bill of Rights.2
This undoubtedly reflected the passions of such regional statesper-
sons as Patrick Henry, who fervently advocated the adoption of a
mandatory clause at the Virginia Convention. 5 However, members
of the First Congress devoted little discussion to the clause's na-
tional acceptance. Only two representatives spoke for the record,2 6
20. Colonial Laws of Mass. 43 (1889) cited in In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 n.1 (1890);
see also FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHAR-
TERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS (1909-1911) cited in GREENE, supra note 19, at 622 (noting
that in 1643, punishment of criminals in the New Haven Colony had to be "according to the mind
of God, revealed in his word, touching such offences, does not exceed stocking and whipping"). A
protest against cruel and barbarous treatment may date back to 1583, when Sir Robert Beale is
said to have vainly asserted such protection under the Magna Carta. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 316 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); see generally Anthony F. Granucci, Nor Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969) (discussing
the history prior to the enactment of the Eighth Amendment punishment clause).
21. GEORGE B. ADAMS AND H. MORSE STEPHENS, SELECT DOCUMENTS OF ENGLISH CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY (1927), cited in GREENE, supra note 19, at 628. In the sixteenth century case of
Titus Oates, an English minister was punished by being defrocked. Granucci, supra note 20 at
856-60. Dissenters argued that the punishment was "barbarous, inhuman, and unchristian ...
and contrary to law." Granucci, supra note 20, at 858 (quoting the dissenting minority of the
House of Lords in the T. Oates decision, D.D.I (1689)). This eventually prompted the House of
Commons to declare the punishment protected. Granucci, supra note 20, at 857-59. As for the
particular combination of the terms "cruel" and "unusual," this may have occurred inadvertently
in a transfer from a draft referring to "illegal and cruel" punishments. See Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 319 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (discussing the history of the terms "cruel"
and "unusual in the Eighth Amendment context).
22. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 319 (discussing the verbatim inclusion of the clause in Virginia's
Declaration of Rights of 1776 and the subsequent adoption by four other states). According to
Granucci, the clause was considered "constitutional 'boilerplate,'" and often adopted with little
discussion. Granucci, supra note 20, at 840.
23. MASS. CONST. of 1780 and N. H. CONST. of 1784, cited in GREENE, supra note 19, at 634,
635.
24. James Madison submitted the first draft of the Bill of Rights to Congress on June 8, 1789.
This included the punishment clause, worded exactly as it would be adopted. 1 ANNALS OF CONG.
431-34 (1789).
25. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 447-49 (2d ed. 1881). Henry feared unchecked punishments would be
inflicted with torturous and relentless severity. Id.
26. 221 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (1789). Unfortunately, no records were kept of the subsequent
Senate deliberations. See LARRY CHARLES BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT 7 (1975) (noting the dearth of records from these important Senate deliberations).
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with one objecting that the import of the words in the clause was
too indefinite," and the other opining rhetorically that:
the clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which account I
have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not
think it necessary. . . No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted;
it is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping,
and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we in future to be prevented
from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel?' 8
With no further debate, the representatives voted on the clause and
approved it for adoption. 9
B. Supreme Court Interpretations.
For ease of analysis, the history of the Supreme Court's construc-
tion of the Eighth Amendment punishment clause can be divided
into three periods: 1) from 1791 until 1890, 2) from 1890 until
1976, and 3) present day, from 1976. From 1791 to 1890, the first
century of the clause's existence, the Court considered very few pun-
ishment cases and applied the clause only on a limited, ad hoc ba-
sis."0 In the next period, roughly spanning eighty-five years, (1890 to
1976), the Court began to generally develop "evolving standards of
decency" as a necessary element of Eighth Amendment construc-
tion.3 1 Finally, since 1976, the Court has construed the clause with
27. William L. Smith of South Carolina, 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (1789).
28. Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire, 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (1789). In 1791, whipping
and ear cropping, as well as branding and pillorying, were common punishments. Joseph L. Hoff-
man, The "Cruel and Unusual Punishment" Clause: A Limit on the Power to Punish or Consti-
tutional Rhetoric? in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA AFTER 200 YEARS 139, 139
(David J. Bodenheimer & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1993). However, other extreme punishments
which were acceptable at the time of the English Bill of Rights' adoption in 1689 were for the
most part rejected by 1791. Id. (noting the move away from punishments of hanging, disembow-
eling, beheading and quartering, and burning at the stake as the proscribed punishment for
treason).
One hundred eighty years later, Justice Thurgood Marshall would recognize Mr. Livermore's
remarks in the First Congress as an acknowledgement "that a prohibition against cruel and un-
usual punishments is a flexible prohibition that may change in meaning as the mores of a society
change." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 321 n.19 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
29. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (1789). The House sent the Bill of Rights to the Senate on Au-
gust 24, 1789. The Senate accepted the amendment without change on September 25, 1789. On
December 15, 1791, all of the eleven states ratifying the Bill of Rights accepted the punishment
clause as part of what would become the Eighth Amendment. See generally BERKSON, supra note
26, at 7-8.
30. See infra notes 33-47 and accompanying text (explaining the limited circumstances in
which the Supreme Court applied the cruel and unusual punishment clause in earlier cases).
31. See infra notes 48-51, 90-110 and accompanying text (explaining the evolution of "evolving
standards of decency" as applied to the Eighth Amendment).
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the careful application of both subjective and objective standards of
proof.32
1. The Early Cases.
In the hundred years after the Eighth Amendment's ratification,
the Supreme Court mentioned the punishment clause in only a
handful of cases.33 In fact, the first notable reference to the clause
did not occur until Pervear v. Massachusetts,3 4 seventy-six years af-
ter the Eighth Amendment's ratification.3 5 The Pervear Court re-
fused to extend Eighth Amendment protection to state legislation,
but revealed in dicta that it saw nothing cruel or unusual in a three-
month sentence to hard labor."
A decade later, in Wilkerson v. Utah,37 the Court issued its first
substantive ruling on cruel and unusual punishment, scrutinizing
uncodified modes of a general execution law.38 The Wilkerson court
declined to give the clause an exact meaning, but found it "safe to
affirm" that the punishment clause forbade such unnecessary cru-
elty as the torture of being dragged to a hanging site.89 The court
added that death by shooting, however, was not cruel and unusual
punishment. °
The Court reaffirmed Wilkerson in In re Kemmler" which specu-
latively added to the list of proscribed punishments the archaic pen-
alties of burning at the stake, crucifixion, and breaking on the
wheel,"' yet refused to be offended by the newly "unusual" mode of
death by electrocution.43 More definitively, the Kemmler Court
32. See infra notes 111-238 and accompanying text (detailing the construction of the clause
using both subjective and objective standards of proof).
33. Other than the three cases discussed herein, the Supreme Court incidentally referred to the
clause in six other cases between 1791 and 1890. Search of WESTLAW, SCT OLD library (Oct.
3, 1994). Of these, Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. 89 (1849), is perhaps the most noteworthy. The
Wilkes Court, reviewing military punishments, noted a strong presumption that "punishment in-
flicted was not immoderate, and not unreasonable." Id. at 132.
34. 72 U.S. 475 (1866).
35. See supra note 29 (noting the amendment's ratification in 1791).
36. 72 U.S. at 480. The defendant was convicted of selling liquor without a license. Id.
37. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
38. Id. at 134-35. As Utah was a territory, the law's applicability to the states was not an issue.
Id. at 130.
39. Id. at 135-36.
40. Id. at 135.
41. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
42. Id. at 446.
43. Id. at 446-47.
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stated, "[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lin-
gering death ...something inhumane and barbarous, something
more than mere extinguishment of life.""
In the twentieth century, the specific focus of Wilkerson and
Kemmler on death penalty inflictions would be revisited, expanded,
and thoroughly discussed.45 This century opened, however, with
Weems v. United States,"' a "hard labor" case that would have sig-
nificant impact on the interpretation of the punishment clause for
capital and non-capital punishment cases alike."'
2. The Transitional Cases of Weems and Trop
In 1910, with Weems v. United States,48 the Supreme Court
forcefully renounced interpretations of the punishment clause that
looked "backwards" for meaning and evoked the need for a progres-
sive understanding of the clause."9 Four decades later, in Trop v.
Dulles,50 a plurality of the Court refined this evocation. Relying di-
rectly on Weems' call for progressiveness, the Trop plurality called
for interpretations that reflected the country's "evolving standards
of decency."51 This phrase characterized the second stage of the
punishment clause's constructional history.
44. Id. at 447.
45. The death penalty debate would culminate in the 1970's, first with Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 240 (1972) (holding that Georgia's capital punishment law violated the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments), and then with Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (allowing the
death penalty to be evaluated on a case by case basis). Whether the death penalty itself is cruel
and unusual punishment is beyond this article's scope, but the nine separate opinions in Furman
combine to provide a full and lengthy discussion of the issue.
While capital punishment will not be directly considered here, capital punishment cases, partic-
ularly Gregg, will be considered to help shed light on the Court's general progress in constructing
the punishment clause. See infra notes 111-20 and accompanying text (discussing the Gregg plu-
rality's application of dual standards of proof to punishment clause claims).
46. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
47. For a discussion of the impact of Weems, see generally Pressly Millen, Note, Interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment - Rummel, Solem, and the Venerable Case of Weems v. United
States, 1984 DUKE L. J. 789, 800-03 (noting that the methods used to interpret the Eighth
Amendment in Weems better follows the drafter's intent than its more recent counterparts).
48. 217 U.S. 349.
49. Id.
50. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
51. Id. at 101.
1994]
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a. "Contemplations . . .of What May Be"' 2
After issuing punishment clause rulings in only five cases,53 the
Supreme Court began in Weems v. United States54 to change the
direction of its interpretive focus from "backwards" to "forwards. 55
Ironically, the Weems Court was not directly presented with the
Eighth Amendment, but rather with an identical clause in the Phil-
ippine Bill of Rights, which the Court held would be given the
"same meaning." 6 To arrive at this conclusion, the Weems Court
took three analytical steps. First, on a primary level, the Court ex-
pressed an imperative to interpret constitutional law in a broad
manner. 57 Next, the Court reviewed the historical and contemporary
debate over the Eighth Amendment clause.58 Finally, the Court
carefully defined the clause in terms of its application to a particu-
lar Philippine penal code. 59
From the outset, the Weems Court refused to exactly define the
cruel and unusual punishment in fixed terms.60 Instead, the Court
52. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
53. Besides Wilkerson and Kemmler, the Court also considered the clause in Howard v. Flem-
ing, 191 U.S. 126 (1903), and Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. 475 (1866); O'Neil v. Vermont,
144 U.S. 323 (1892).
The dissent of O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 370-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting), followed by the majority in
Howard, 191 U.S. at 134-37, introduced the issue of proportionality, requiring the punishment to
fit the crime. This issue would also be noted briefly in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
379-82 (McKenna, J., majority), 385-86 (White, J., dissenting) (1910). Like the death penalty
issue, proportionality would later become the subject of extensive debate. More recently, in
Harmelin v. Michigan, 11I S. Ct. 2680 (1991), Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist
formed a plurality in favor of abandoning proportionality as an Eighth Amendment consideration.
Harmelin, Ill S. Ct. at 2684-92. For a thorough discussion on proportionality see, Pamela L.
Bailey, Note, Harmelin V. Michigan: Is The Eighth Amendment's Proportionality Guarantee
Left An Empty Shell?, 24 PAc. LJ. 221 (1992).
54. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
55. Id. at 376-77 (distinguishing state cases according to whether or not they "look[ed] back-
wards for examples by which to fix the meaning of the clause"). Thus, Weems' alternative to the
"backwards-looking" method of interpretation was not wholly original.
56. Id. at 367 ("[T]he provision of the Philippine bill of rights, prohibiting the infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment, was taken from the Constitution of the United States and must
have the same meaning.").
57. Id. at 373-75. Although these "steps" were not announced or clearly separated, the process
is generally evident in the opinion.
58. Id. at 368-73, 375-77.
59. Id. at 377-82.
60. In framing the issue, the Court purported to seek an exact definition. The court stated that
"[wihat constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment has not been exactly decided." Id. at 368. It
further noted that "[n]o case has occurred in this court which has called for an exhaustive defini-
tion." Id. at 369. However, the Court rejected this ostensible pursuit of a general definition of the
clause in its primary level of analysis by limiting it's definition to the Philippine code section. Id.
at 373-75.
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found that the clause "may be . . . progressive, and is not fastened
to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by a humane justice."' 61 The Court considered that the
Constitution's "meaning and vitality" had often developed broadly,
"against narrow and restrictive construction."'62 Thus, "our contem-
plation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be."' 3
While refusing to commit to a static meaning, the Court still
needed to apply a contemporary understanding of the clause. In
reaching this understanding, the Court noted a long running debate
over the clause's application which sides were formed even before
the Eighth Amendment was nationally proposed." On the one side
was Patrick Henry of the Virginia Convention65 and "those who be-
lieved as he did."66 On the other side was William Wilson of the
Pennsylvania Convention6 ' and "those who thought like Wilson."6
Patrick Henry was the epitome of a "man of action" who would
"take no chances."'69 Observing Henry's side of the debate, the
Court noted a concern for potential abuses of power, such as extor-
61. Id. at 378.
62. Id. at 373.
63. Id. Justice McKenna's stirring discourse deserves a more extensive repeating here:
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an experi-
ence of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to
the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence
new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of
wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of
constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions.
They are, to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "designed to approach immor-
tality as nearly as human institutions can approach it." The future is their care and
provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophecy can be made. In
the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what
has been but of what may be. Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be as
easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general princi-
ples would have little value and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless
formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality. And this has been recog-
nized. The meaning and vitality of the Constitution have developed against narrow
and restrictive construction.
Id.
64. See Millen, supra note 47, at 801-03 (discussing Weems' establishment of debate
paradigms).
65. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing Patrick Henry's advocacy of a pun-
ishment clause with mandatory restrictions).
66. Weems, 217 U.S. at 372.
67. See 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 25, at 416, 454 (discussing William Wilson's advocacy
of no judicial involvement).
68. Weems, 217 U.S. at 372.
69. Id. ("Henry and those who believed as he did would take no chances .... They were men
of action, practical and sagacious, not beset with vain imagining .... ").
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tion and oppression: "[I]t must have come to them [the founders]
that there could be exercises of cruelty by laws other than those
which inflicted bodily pain or mutilation."7 The Weems Court de-
termined that the founders created the punishment clause out of
fear that those given power might be tempted to a "coercive
cruelty." 71
In contrast, William Wilson strongly believed "the spirit of lib-
erty could be trusted" to legislators."2 Proponents of Wilson's
"trust" argument assigned a more passive definition to the clause,
narrowly relating it to historical atrocities.73 Among his more nota-
ble proponents was Justice Joseph Story, who commented that
"[tihe provision would seem to be wholly unnecessary in a free gov-
ernment, since it is scarcely possible that any department of such a
government should authorize or justify such atrocious behavior. ' '17
The Weems Court noted similar views held by contemporary state
courts.75 For example, one court queried whether at the end of the
1800's the clause was not obsolete.76
If Wilson's proponents saw any purpose at all in the punishment
clause, they believed it served as an "admonition," either to the
courts alone 77 or, more expansively (although still an admonition
and not a command), to all government departments. 78  For the
Weems majority, Henry's "temptation" concerns clearly prevailed
over Wilson's "trust" argument.7 9 At the same time, while rejecting
70. Id.
71. Id. at 373.
72. Id. at 372 (citing generally from 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES (1881)). For a complete look at
Wilson's argument, see 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 25, at 418-529.
73. Weems, 217 U.S. at 373.
74. JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 710 (Ron-
ald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., 1987).
75. Weems, 217 U.S. at 376. "Other cases have given a narrower construction, feeling con-
strained thereto by the incidences of history." Id. "Other cases might be cited in illustration, some
looking backwards for examples by which to fix the meaning of the clause ...." Id. at 376-77.
The Weems court cites one backwards looking opinion with particular contempt: "In Common-
wealth v. Wyatt ...the whipping post had to be justified and was justified. In comparison with
the 'barbarities of quartering, hanging in chains, castration, etc.,' it was easily reduced to insignifi-
cance. The court in the latter case pronounced it 'odious but not unusual.'" Id. at 377 (quoting
Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 6 Rand. 694 (Va. 1828)).
76. Id. at 376 (citing Hobbs v. State, 32 N.E. 1019, 1021 (Ind. 1893)).
77. See Hobbs, 32 N.E. at 1021 ("The word, according to modern interpretation, does not
affect legislation providing imprisonment for life or for years").
78. See STORY, supra note 74, at 710 (interpreting the clause as a broadly applied admonition).
79. This can be inferred from the Court's abhorrence at looking backward for meaning.
Weems, 217 U.S. at 376-77.
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the "admonition" interpretation,8" the Court chose to adopt the
broader view of this theory, which justified a judicial review of the
Philippine legislation.81
The law in question was a penal code which imposed a sentence
of twelve years and one day to twenty years imprisonment, a perpet-
ually chained ankle and wrist, "hard and painful labor," and a total
restriction from outside assistance.82 In reviewing this law, the
Court attached certain definite meanings to the terms of the punish-
ment clause, thus providing the third and final step of its analysis.8"
The Weems Court held that the penal law was "cruel in its excess of
imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows imprison-
ment [and] unusual in its character. 8 4 Moreover, the Eighth
Amendment applied to punishments according to "degree and
kind."'85 As for the degree of the Philippine punishment, the Court
was troubled with the lack of proportionality with the crime 6 and
concerned about the reach of the punishment beyond penal
purposes.87
80. Id. at 376 (suggesting the clause is not obsolete, but warning the Court not to inflict pun-
ishments which do not fit the crime).
81. Id. at 377. The court also found justification in President Theodore Roosevelt's 1902 actions
over the Philippine Commission. Id. at 367; see Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 104
(1904) (discussing the President's order of 1900 and the act of 1901 which bound the Philippine
Islands to our government's Bill of Rights).
82. Weems, 217 U.S. at 364. This was called the penalty of "cadena temporal," adopted from
the Spanish penal code. It was accompanied, in this case, by "accessory penalties," which included
civil interdiction, perpetual disqualifications, and lifetime surveillance. Id. at 364, 380.
83. Id. at 377-82.
84. Id.
85. Id. By comparison, the dissent in Weems, which would have applied the Eighth Amend-
ment only to review a court sentencing, argued that "cruel" is equated with the infliction of "un-
necessary bodily suffering through a resort to inhumane methods for causing bodily torture." Id.
at 409 (White, J., dissenting). If the question was merely "severe," it was strictly a question for
legislators. Id. at 405. The dissent tied "unusual" to the degree, mode, kind and extent of punish-
ment. Id. at 409-10.
86. Id. at 380-82 (majority); id. at 385-86 (dissent, interpreting majority). For more on propor-
tionality, see supra note 53 (discussing the dissenting opinion of O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323
(1892) and its progeny).
87. Weems, 217 U.S. at 380-81. Regarding a legitimate exercise of punishment, the court noted
that "(t]he purpose of punishment is fulfilled, crime is repressed by penalties of just, not tor-
menting, severity, its repetition is prevented, and hope is given for the reformation of the crimi-
nal." Id. at 381. This focus on purpose was repeated in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). See
infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text (discussing the Trop decision's distinction between pur-
poseful punishment and punishment merely labeled as such). The Court later emphasized the
"penalogical purpose" behind administrative treatment and prison conditions in Rhodes v. Chap-
man, 452 U.S. 337, 345-47 (1981) and Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318-26 (1986). See infra
notes 130-38 and accompanying text (noting the Rhodes opinion's tolerance for intended
harshness).
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Although the Weems Court argued against confinement of the
punishment clause to a fixed, historical definition, it nevertheless
provided what was by far the most particular construction of the
clause in its first 120 years of existence.8 8 With Weems' blessing, the
particularity of the Supreme Court interpretations would increase in
the next eighty-five years.89 Yet, the Court would rarely match
Weems in the range of its detail.
b. "Evolving Standards of Decency" 90
In the fifty years following the Weems decision, the Supreme
Court decided only a few punishment clause cases.9 1 Among these
was Trop v. Dulles,92 a case that conspicuously contributed to the
Court's ongoing construction of the punishment clause. Trop is per-
haps best known for coining the "evolving standards of decency"
phrase,9" although it explicitly did so as a rephrasing of Weems' call
for nonstatic interpretations of the clause.94 On its own, Trop may
have also contributed to further understanding of the punishment
clause by assigning new meaning to several of the clause's individual
88. See supra notes 60-63, 84-87 and accompanying text (discussing the Weems court's con-
struction of the cruel and unusual punishment clause).
89. See supra notes 90-238 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause from 1910 to today).
90. The term "evolving standards of decency" was first articulated in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86 (1958). For discussion of the Trop decision, see infra notes 92-104 and accompanying text.
91. The three cases after Weems were Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916), United
States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921), and
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947). Of these, the most significant case
was Resweber, which held that an electrocution effort which took two attempts did not amount to
cruel and unusual punishment. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464. Perhaps more importantly, four jus-
tices in Resweber extended the Eighth Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Id. at 462-63. This extension would be endorsed by the majority holdings in Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 660-68 (1962) and Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 517-37 (1968). See
infra note 108 (discussing Robinson and Powell).
92. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Trop was the next significant case following Resweber.
93. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 ("The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."). More extensively, the Trop
opinion stated:
The provisions of the Constitution are not time-worn adages or hollow shibboleths.
They are vital, living principles that authorize and limit governmental powers in our
Nation. They are the rules of government. When the constitutionality of an Act of
Congress is challenged in this Court, we must apply those rules. If we do not, the
words of the Constitution become little more than good advice.
Id. at 103-04.
94. Id. at 100-01 (noting immediately before the "evolving standards" directive that the Weems
court "recognized ... that the words of the Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is
not static").
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terms.95
The central question in Trop was whether statutory expatriation
of a former convict was considered punishment. 96 Led by Chief Jus-
tice Earl Warren, a four member plurality determined that it did
not matter whether the law in question was labeled a penal law97 or
was simply penal in character. 8 Punishment, the plurality opinion
argued, was defined by purpose; thus, a statute that deprived a per-
son of rights was punitive in nature if that was the legislature's
intent.99
The Trop opinion noted further that the words "cruel and un-
usual" could either reflect the "basic prohibition against inhumane
treatment" or might hold distinct meanings.100 Separating the
terms, the Court found "unusual" to mean "something different
from that which is generally done."101 By application, this included
denationalization, a punishment similar to that in Trop.102 The opin-
ion did not expressly define "cruel", but inferred that the stripping
of a person's citizenship was cruel because its destructiveness, de-
spite the lack of physical mistreatment, made it "more primitive
than torture."103 The opinion further stated that "[ilt is no answer
to suggest that all the disastrous consequences of this fate may not
be brought to bear on a stateless person. The threat makes the pun-
95. For a discussion of the meanings attached to those terms by the Trop court see infra notes
100-05 and accompanying text.
96. Trop, 356 U.S. at 94.
97. Id. at 94-95 ("How simple would be the tasks of constitutional adjudication and of law
generally if specific problems could be solved by inspection of the labels pasted on them! ...
Doubtless even a clear legislative classification of a statute as 'non-penal' would not alter the
fundamental nature of a plainly penal statute.").
98. Id.
99. Id. at 96-98. In contrast with the statutory intent, punishment could not be determined by
a statute's penal result; thus, deportation, intended to enforce immigration laws, was not the same
as denationalization, intended to punish an individual. Id. at 98.
100. Id. at 100-01 n.32 (noting a split between courts). An example of one court's reluctance to
separate the terms can be seen in the notable subsequent circuit court case of Jackson v. Bishop,
404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968) (Blackmun, C. J.) ("We choose to draw no significant distinc-
tion between the word 'cruel' and the word 'unusual'.... We would not wish to place ourselves
in the position of condoning punishment which is shown to be only 'cruel' but not 'unusual' or vice
versa.").
101. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01 n.32. The separate definition of "unusual" was later considered
by a two-justice plurality in Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2691 (1991) (citing Web-
ster's Dictionary's 1828 edition and Webster's 2d International Dictionary to show that the word
"unusual" had the same meaning in 1828 "'such as [does not] occu[r] in ordinary practice,'" as
it has today "'[sluch as is [not] in common use' ") (alterations in original).
102. Trop, 356 U.S. at 94-95.
103. Id. at 101.
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ishment obnoxious." 104
Despite these other pronouncements in the Trop opinion, its dec-
laration of "evolving standards" would remain its most enduring
contribution to case law. While the directive has occasionally taken
different forms 1°5 and is now commonly credited to the majority
opinion of Estelle v. Gamble,106 it continues to be recited as an ob-
jective element of the punishment clause analysis more than thirty-
five years after its declaration in Trop and eighty-five years after its
progressive roots in Weems.10 7
3. Modern Cases and the Application of Standards.
After Trop, the number of punishment cases reviewed by the Su-
preme Court began to increase.10 8 As this occurred, the Court
started supplementing Trop's "evolving standards of decency" with
104. Id. at 102. A fifth justice, Justice Brennan, concurred with the Warren opinion in this
regard, asserting that "(tihe uncertainty, and the consequent psychological hurt" were substantial
contributors to the ultimate judgment. Id. at 111 (Brennan, J., concurring). However, Brennan
did not base his concurrence on the Eighth Amendment but on the unreasonable relation in this
case between crime and punishment. Id.
105. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000 (1992) ("contextual and responsive
to 'contemporary standards of decency' "); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) ("the
minimal civilized measure of life's necessities . . . under the contemporary standard of decency");
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 329 n.37 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("flexible .. .as
public opinion changed"); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) ("in the light of
contemporary human knowledge").
106. 429 U.S- 97, 103 (1976) (requiring ap'plication of "contemporary standards of decency as
manifested in modern legislation"). As noted, Estelle was not the first majority decision after
Trop to adopt the "evolving standards" directive. See supra note 105. (discussing earlier cases
adopting this standard).
107. See supra notes 48-89 and accompanying text (showing Weems to be the origin of "evolv-
ing standards").
108. The increase was largely the result of Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) and
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), the two cases immediately following Trop. These cases
permanently extended the Eighth Amendment to state activities through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667; Powell, 392 U.S. at 531-32. Because states
legislate, sentence and administer punishment more extensively than the federal government,
Robinson and Powell opened the Supreme Court's doors to a significant amount of litigation. At
the time of Trop, the eighth amendment had been law for 167 years, yet the Supreme Court had
substantively considered the punishment clause in only seven other cases. See Arthur J. Goldberg
and Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773,
1777 n.17 (1970) (listing the cases up to Powell in which the Supreme Court substantially dis-
cussed the clause). After Robinson and Powell, the Court heard 19 cases in 10 years; between
1968 and 1993 it addressed the issue of cruel and unusual punishment in approximately 100 cases.
Search of WESTLAW, SCT library (Oct. 3, 1994).
Substantively, both Robinson and Powell considered the issue of whether a person could be
punished for the "status" or "condition" of being a substance abuser. The cases concluded that
punishment of status alone is cruel and unusual. Powell, 392 U.S. 514, 533; accord Robinson, 370
U.S. at 667.
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standards of subjective proof.10 9 Eventually, the Court required a
dual consideration of these standards, shaping the subjective stan-
dard as a measure of a contextual state of mind and the objective
standard as a measure of contextual seriousness. 110
a. The Development of Objective and Subjective Measures
Eighteen years after the Trop case, in Gregg v. Georgia,"' a
three justice plurality found that the Trop "standards of decency"
were relevant, but not conclusive." 2 While the evolving "standards
of decency" required courts to measure public attitudes according to
"objective indicia," free from "subjective judgment,""' 3 the Gregg
plurality believed courts also had to consider whether punishment
was "excessive,"" 4 either by involving "unnecessary and wanton in-
fliction of pain"" 5 or by being "grossly out of proportion" to the
crime's severity." 6
A majority of the Court in Estelle v. Gamble" 7 endorsed the
Gregg formula with a slight, yet important, variation. The Gregg
opinion indicated that courts had to consider both the "objective"
109. See infra notes 121-41 (discussing the subjective standards).
110. See infra notes 168-238 (discussing the application of each of the two standards in
Helling).
111. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (allowing states to impose capital punishment for murder
convictions).
112. Id. at 173.
113. Id.
114. Id. "A penalty also must accord with 'the dignity of man,' which is the 'basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment.'. . . This means, at least, that the punishment not be 'exces-
sive.'" Id. (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)). The Gregg plurality was careful to
point out, however, that in making its subjective judgment of excessiveness, the judiciary still
owed a certain amount of deference to legislators. Id. at 174-76.
115. Id. at 173 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 392-93 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing)). The term "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" is actually an interpretation of an
interpretation of an interpretation. Initially, the Court in Wilkerson v. Utah interpreted the pun-
ishment clause as a bar against "unnecessary cruelty." 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878); see supra notes
38-41 and accompanying text (discussing the Wilkerson case and what constitutes "unnecessary
cruelty"). The court used a similar phrase, "unnecessary pain," in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, which also referred to "the wanton infliction of pain." 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947). In
Furman v. Georgia, dissenting Chief Justice Burger objected to any isolation of the word "unnec-
essary" and interpreted these phrases as strictly prohibiting "the wanton infliction of physical
pain." 408 U.S. 238, 392-93 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Finally, the joint opinion in Gregg
coined the phrase "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," directly crediting the Burger dis-
sent in Furman. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
116. Gregg. 428 U.S. at 173. For the background and development of proportionality construc-
tions, see supra note 53.
117. 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (finding the denial of prisoner's medical care to be unconstitutional).
Estelle followed Gregg by only four months.
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standard of decency and the "subjective" standard of excessive-
ness.' 18 By contrast, the Court in Estelle ostensibly required the
Court to consider a choice of standards, stating: "we have held re-
pugnant to the Eighth Amendment punishments which are incom-
patible with 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the pro-
gress of a maturing society,' . . . or which 'involve the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain.' "19 In future cases, however, the
Court returned to Gregg's dual consideration of the standards with
no allowance for choice. 2°
b. Subjective Measures of a Contextual State of Mind.
As noted, Estelle v. Gamble followed the language of both Trop
("evolving standards") and Gregg ("unnecessary and wanton stan-
dard"). 12 ' Additionally, Estelle added its own terms to the spectrum
of Supreme Court interpretations. Noting that prison officials owed
a common-law duty of care to its prisoners,' 2 2 the Court specifically
concluded that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain'
...proscribed by the Eighth Amendment."' 23 While the "deliber-
ate indifference" standard applied broadly to the denial, delay, in-
terference, or responsive indifference to a prisoner's medical needs,
it did not apply to inadvertent failures. 24
118. See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text (noting Gregg's deeming of the Trop stan-
dard as "relevant," but "not conclusive").
119. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102-03 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Estelle did not refer
directly to excessiveness, but noted that grossly disproportionate punishments were also pro-
scribed. Id.
The either-or language in Estelle is somewhat clouded by another statement in the case that
combines the alternatives: "The infliction of such unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with con-
temporary standards of decency as manifested in modern legislation. ... Id. at 103 (referring
to the nonpenalogical denial of medical care to prisoners). Nevertheless, a combination of the
alternatives in one instance does not preclude the Estelle Court's call for separate consideration of
the alternatives.
120. The Court later applied the dual standards consideration in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337 (1981). See infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text (discussing the application in Rhodes).
121. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing the Estelle Court's reliance on
these phrases).
122. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04, (noting codifications of common law in 22 states and exempli-
fying the common law rule in Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291 (1926)). In Spicer, the court
held, "[i]t is but just that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot, by reason of
the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself." Spicer, 132 S.E. at 293.
123. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (citation omitted). For the derivation of the "unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain" phrase, see supra note 115.
124. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05.
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Estelle's "deliberate indifference" standard would eventually take
a prominent place in reviewing conditions of confinement cases. 125
However, for the next sixteen years the Supreme Court clearly
avoided extending Estelle's standard to other instances. 12 6 In Ingra-
ham v. Wright, 2 7 the Court stated in dicta that only the "unneces-
sary and wanton infliction of pain" would constitute cruel and un-
usual punishment in prison condition and treatment cases.'28 Five
years later, a majority of the Court subscribed to this view in
Rhodes v. Chapman, 2 9 holding that conditions of confinement
claims required a showing of an unnecessary and wanton inflic-
tion.' 30 Rhodes expressly refused to extend the "wanton and unnec-
essary" standard to include acts of deliberate indifference, reasoning
that harsh conditions may sometimes be an intentional part of the
penalty. 13'
The Court adhered to this reasoning in Whitley v. Albers3 2
which held that harmful treatment would be measured by an "obdu-
racy and wantonness" standard unless it "purported to be punish-
ment."1 33 The Whitley Court explained that Estelle's deliberate in-
difference standard might be appropriate in some cases, but in the
context of a prison official's use of disciplinary force, the Court had
to inquire whether the official acted "'maliciously and sadistically'"
or in "'good faith.' "134 In any case, the measuring standard in-
125. See Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991). For a discussion of Wilson, see infra notes
136-141 and accompanying text.
126. The next extension of the standard was in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). See
infra note 128 (discussing the extension in Youngberg).
127. 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (addressing the issue of whether the Eighth Amendment applied to
corporal punishment of school children).
128. Id. at 669-71. The Ingraham Court held that the Eighth Amendment applied only to
punishment of criminal behavior, and thus was inapplicable to corporal punishment of school chil-
dren. Id. at 671 n.40; see also Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 325 (holding that the Eighth Amendment
was not the measure for protection of persons who were voluntarily committed). But see
DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189, 198 (1989) (suggesting that children in state
custody may be able to claim deliberate indifference to serious medical needs).
129. 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (allowing double ceiling of prisoners as long as there was no unneces-
sary and wanton treatment).
130. Id. at 347. Rhodes also required a violation of contemporary standards, thus rejecting
Estelle's alternative consideration of the objective and subjective standards. Id.
131. Id.
132. 475 U.S. 312 (1986) (applying the punishment clause to a prison official's use of deadly
force during a prison riot).
133. Id. at 319.
134. Id. at 320-21 (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied
sub nora. John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033) (1973)). This standard would later be used in Hudson
v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992), which would call Whitley's test "the core judicial inquiry"
1994]
DEPA UL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:215
volved more than an ordinary standard of care.'13 5
The deliberate indifference standard was again used in Wilson v.
Seiter. 36  Wilson extended the application of Estelle's standard to
all inhumane prison condition cases where there was a deprivation
of "a single, identifiable human need."'' 37 This standard included the
inadequate medical care Estelle had prohibited, 3 8 as well as depri-
vations of food, warmth, exercise and protection from other in-
mates. 3 9 The Court further held that beyond an objective showing
of sufficient harm, the deprivation's subjective effect on the prisoner
was irrelevant. 40 Instead, the Court required a subjective considera-
tion of the prison official's deliberative intent, declaring this to be an
integral part of the meaning of punishment.'
c. Objective Measures of Contextual Seriousness
Besides discussing the subjective "deliberate indifference" stan-
dard, the Wilson Court made several references to an objective stan-
dard, 42 marking the Supreme Court's definite return to the Gregg
for excessive use of force claims. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999.
135. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. Whitley also cited Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652
(7th Cir. 1985), a case which equated deliberate indifference with criminal recklessness. Whitley.
475 U.S. at 321.
136. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991) (considering the applicability of the punishment clause to various
conditions of prison confinement).
137. Id. at 2327. The primary question continued to be whether the conduct was "wanton," but
this varied according to the constraints on the prison official. The court held that a "deliberate
indifference standard" applied to cases involving nonmedical conditions because the constraints in
these cases were similar to the constraints in medical condition cases. Id.
138. The Estelle Court was necessarily concerned with medical treatment, but its ruling was
not expressly limited to that point. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing the
general duty of care owed to prisoners).
139. Wilson, 11I S. Ct. at 2326-27.
140. The court refused to find relevance in the prisoner's contention that there was no "'detri-
ment to bodily integrity, pain, injury or loss of life.' " Id. at 2326 (quoting Respondent's Brief 28-
29). However, this was "assuming the conduct is harmful enough to satisfy the objective compo-
nent of an Eighth Amendment claim." Id.
141. See id. at 2325 (citing Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985). "'The
infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter. This is what the word
meant today; it is what it meant in the eighteenth century.'" Id. (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481
F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir. 1973). The court further noted, " '[t]he thread common to all [Eighth
Amendment prison cases] is that 'punishment' has been deliberately administered for a penal or
disciplinary purpose.'" Id. (quoting Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1032). The court in Wilson concluded:
"[a]n intent requirement is either implicit in the word 'punishment' or is not; it cannot be alter-
nately required and ignored as policy considerations might dictate." Id. at 2326.
142. Id. at 2324 (explaining the objective component as asking, "[W]as the deprivation suffi-
ciently serious?" and the subjective component as asking, "[D]id the officials act with a suffi-
ciently culpable state of mind?"). Justice White's concurring opinion argued that only the objec-
tive component should be considered. id. at 2329-30 (White, J., concurring).
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plurality's dual inquiry in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. S
However, just as Gregg's subjective standard had transformed over
time from an excessiveness inquiry to an inquiry into state of
mind,"' the objective standard had assumed different proportions as
well. "145 From Trop to Wilson, the Court changed its objective in-
quiry from a general question of contemporary values to a more par-
ticular question of fact-based seriousness. "6
In Gregg, the plurality generally defined the objective standard in
terms of derivative contemporary values. 1 7 This opinion called for a
consideration of "objective indicia that reflect the public atti-
tude,"" 8 and gave strong deference in this inquiry to legislators and
jurors." '9 A year later, a plurality of the Court in Coker v. Geor-
gia'5' advised other courts not only to defer to legislators and the
public, but to consider objective factors derived from them "to the
maximum possible extent."'' The Court further extended this def-
erence in later cases to the objective decisions of prison administra-
tors' 52 and security guards. 153
At the same time, the Court began to allow an objective inquiry
into particular factors of severity or seriousness. In Hutto v. Fin-
ney, '5 the Court approved a lower court's consideration of certain
prison condition factors, including prisoners' diet, overcrowding,
vandalism, rampant violence and the unprofessional conduct of
prison officials.' 55 By contrast, in Rhodes v. Chapman,"'5 the Court
143. See supra notes 108-20 and accompanying text (discussing the development of the dual
inquiry).
144. See supra notes 121-41 and accompanying text (discussing the post-Gregg development of
the subjective standard).
145. See infra notes 147-67 (discussing the changing proportions of the objective standard).
146. See supra notes 90-120, 147-67 and accompanying text (discussing the changing focus of
the objective standard through the years).
147. 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 174-75, 181-82.
150. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion).
151. Id. at 592. Coker is cited with approval by a majority in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,
274-75 (1980).
152. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 n.14, 352 (1981) (allowing prison administra-
tors to determine whether double ceiling is cruel and unusual punishment); Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 547 (1979)("Prison officials must be free to take appropriate actions.").
153. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1986) (stating that prison security guards
deserved deference when faced with "riotous inmates").
154. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
155. Id. at 687 (stating that "[t]he court was entitled to consider the severity of those violations
in assessing the constitutionality of conditions in the isolation cells"); see also Rhodes, 452 U.S. at
347 (characterizing Hutto as finding prison conditions ."constituted cruel and unusual punishment
1994]
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rejected a prison conditions claim against double ceiling because
there were no intolerable conditions, no deprivations of essentials, no
violence, and no pain. 5 '
A decade later, in Wilson v. Seiter,15 8 the Court characterized the
Rhodes decision as focusing on the punishment clause's objective
component by asking whether the prisoner's deprivations were "suf-
ficiently serious"."' A year later, the Court further explained in
Hudson v. McMillian'"0 that the Rhodes measure of "seriousness"
was "contextual and responsive to 'contemporary standards of de-
cency.' "I6" Thus, in the context of prison condition complaints, only
extreme deprivations were sufficiently grave, while routine discom-
fort was "'part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their
offenses against society.' "I6" Likewise, a prisoner's medical needs
had to be more serious than a person with unqualified access.' 6
Claims regarding an official use of force,' on the other hand, did
not require a significant injury, although the force generally had to
be excessive. 6 The dissent in Hudson objected to this contextual
application of seriousness, arguing that a use of force causing only
insignificant harm "may be immoral, it may be tortious, it may be
criminal, . . . but it is not 'cruel and unusual punishment.' "I6" In
because they resulted in unquestioned and serious deprivation of basic human needs").
156. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
157. Id. at 347-48.
158. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
159. Id. at 2324. The "seriousness" requirement may be attributed to Estelle v. Gamble. 429
U.S. 97, 105 (1976). The Estelle Court noted that "deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious
illness or injury states a cause of action under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983." Id.
160. 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992) (applying the punishment clause to a prison guard's infliction of
minor injuries).
161. Id. at 1000 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103). Hudson required a dual inquiry, asking if
officials had a "sufficiently culpable state of mind" as well as if the "alleged wrongdoing was
objectively 'harmful enough' to establish a constitutional violation." Id. at 999 (citing Wilson, Ill
S. Ct. at 2326).
162. Id. at 1000 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
163. Id. (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04).
164. See supra note 133-35 and accompanying text (discussing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312 (1986), which distinguished the use of disciplinary force from other punishment cases).
165. 112 S. Ct. at 1000. Hudson measures excessiveness according to society's expectations and
prohibiting malicious and sadistic use of force without evidence of significant injury, but allows
"de minimis uses of physical force, [if not] 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind.'" Id. (quot-
ing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327 and Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 to which it attributes the "repugnant to
the conscience" standard). The phrase actually derives from due process jurisprudence, specifically
from Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937). It was initially applied to the punishment
clause in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 471-72 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
166. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1005 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent further stated,
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the dissent's opinion, the objective standard required the plaintiff's
injury to be "serious" regardless of the nature of the punishment.1, 7
d. The Application of Dual Standards in Helling v. McKinney
Within two years of Wilson and Hudson, the Court refined its
dual standard review in the prison condition case of Helling v. Mc-
Kinney. 6 ' In Helling, a Nevada prisoner shared a cell with an in-
mate who smoked five packs of cigarettes a day.'69 The prisoner
claimed the cigarettes "burned continuously,' '1 70 and sued prison of-
ficials for assigning him to the cell space, for selling cigarettes with-
out warning inmates of secondary smoke dangers, and for affecting
and jeopardizing his health.' 7 ' The prisoner claimed relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983,172 and evoked the Eighth Amendment punishment
clause as his qualifying right.' 73
Between the filing of the suit in 1987 and its consideration by the
Supreme Court in 1993,174 prison officials moved the prisoner away
To reject the notion that the infliction of concededly 'minor' injuries can be considered
'cruel' or 'unusual' 'punishment' (much less cruel and unusual punishment) is not to
say that it amounts to acceptable conduct. Rather, it is to recognize that primary
responsibility for preventing and punishing such conduct rests not with the Federal
Constitution but with the laws and regulations of the various states.
Id. at 1010. Cf. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2701 (1991) (Scalia, J., in the portion of
his opinion in which one justice joined and three justices concurred) ("Severe, mandatory penal-
ties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitutional sense, having been employed in
various forms throughout our Nation's history."); see also Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032
(2d Cir. 1973) (holding that "although a spontaneous attack by a guard is 'cruel' and, we hope,
'unusual,' it does not fit any ordinary concept of 'punishment' "), cert. denied sub noam. John v.
Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). But see Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir.
1985) ("If a guard decided to supplement a prisoner's official punishment by beating him, this
would be punishment ...."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986). See also Jackson v. Bishop, 404
F.2d 571, 578 (1968) (showing a reluctance to condone punishment which is cruel but not
unusual).
167. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1010.
168. 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993).
169. Id. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider the factual import of this case apart
from the case's development of Eighth Amendment interpretation. For a complete discussion on
the unique substantive implications of environmental tobacco smoke in prisons, see Jeffrey S.
Kinsler, Exposure to Tobacco Smoke Is More Than Offensive, It Is Cruel And Unusual Punish-
ment, 27 VAL. U. L. REV. 385 (1993).
170. 113 S. Ct. at 2478.
171. Id. The prisoner alleged health problems caused by the smoke as well as the jeopardy of
developing future health problems, but the courts limited the focus to the issue of the prisoner's
jeopardy because evidence did not support the claim of any current health problem. Id.
172. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (civil action for deprivation of rights).
173. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2476.
174. The suit was filed in January, 1987. Brief for Respondent 1992 WL 51200, at *1, Helling
v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993) (No. 91-1958) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. The case
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:215
from the heavy smoker,' 8 and instituted a formal policy against
smoking in certain public areas.'7 6 Nevertheless, because the pris-
oner remained subject to future assignment with another heavy
smoker, the litigation proceeded. 77
Beyond its factual intrigue, the prisoner's punishment claim even-
tually spawned a number of legal questions.' 7 8 At the trial court
level, however, the magistrate compressed the range of potential
questions into two fundamental issues: the prisoner's right to a
smoke free environment and of the prison officials' culpability.'7 9
Regarding the first issue, the magistrate considered whether a pris-
oner had a constitutional right to a smoke-free environment.' 80 Not-
ing that society had not yet resolved the issue of smoke-free environ-
ments, the Court concluded that no such right presently existed.' 8'
Turning to the second issue, the magistrate allowed the prisoner to
alternatively prove the prison officials' culpability by showing their
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.'8 2 The magis-
trate, however, found no evidence of this sort and granted the de-
fendants' motion for a directed verdict.' 83
On the prisoner's appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
considered the two issues spelled out by the lower court, and splin-
tered both of them." On the first issue, the appellate court agreed
was argued before the Supreme Court on January 13, 1993, and decided June 18, 1993. Helling,
113 S. Ct. at 2475.
175. The move occurred in February, 1991. Brief for Respondent, supra note 174, at *8.
176. The prison adopted the smoking policy on January 10, 1992, restricting common-area
smoking to designated areas and permitting smoke-free dormitory settings and bunk assignments
on a space available basis. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2482 (citing App. to Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae A1-A2).
177. Id. at 2482. Ironically, the prisoner's attorney raised the issue of mootness before the
Supreme Court while the state's attorneys argued to press on. See Brief for Respondent, supra
note 174, at *10; Brief for Petitioner, 1992 WL 512101 at *1-*2, Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct.
2475 (1993) (No. 91-1958) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
178. The claim generated a litany of legal questions, addressing such concerns as society's right
to a smoke-free environment, the involuntary imposition on prisoners, the permissible levels of
smoke exposure, the type and temporal nature of the harm, the relevant degree of risk, the seri-
ousness of the consequences, the defendant's role and affirmative duties, the mens rea required,
and, ultimately, the meaning and application of Eighth Amendment terms. For an illustration of
the range of questions considered, see Prisons and Jails: Cruel and Unusual Punishment; In-
mate's Involuntary Exposure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke, 61 U.S.L.W. 3518 (U.S. Feb. 2,
1993) (giving an editorial summary of the Oral Arguments).
179. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2478 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. D2-D3).
180. Id.
181. Id. (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. D3, D6).
182. Id. (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. D6-D1O).
183. Id.
184. McKinney v. Anderson, 924 F.2d 1500 (9th Cir. 1991).
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that a prisoner has no constitutional right to a smoke-free environ-
ment. 185 However, the Court determined that it was not an all-or-
nothing issue; the levels of smoke exposure were variable, and soci-
ety's standards of decency would not tolerate unreasonably danger-
ous levels of involuntary exposure.186 Similarly, the court affirmed
the magistrate's finding that the plaintiff had not proven deliberate
indifference to his immediate medical symptoms and therefore had
no claim to present damages.'87 Nevertheless, the appellate court
held the plaintiff had* stated a valid cause of action based on the risk
of future harm to his health.'88 With both issues expanded, the
court returned the case to the magistrate with directions to allow
the prisoner to prove that the level of smoke exposure constituted an
unreasonable danger to his future health. 8 9
Prison officials promptly sought Supreme Court review.' 90 In re-
sponse, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the appellate
court's judgment, and remanded the case' 9' for further considera-
tion in light of its recent emphasis on the deliberate indifference
standard in Wilson v. Seiter. 92 On reconsideration, the appellate
court acknowledged the subjective requirement of Wilson, but con-
tinued to call for objective proof of an unreasonable health risk.'93
Underlining its previous holding that both degree of exposure and
future risk of harm should be considered, the appellate court rein-
stated its remand to the lower court.9
Prison officials petitioned once again for Supreme Court review,
this time noting a split among appellate courts on the objective
proof issue.' 98 The Supreme Court granted certiorari a second
185. Id. at 1507-09.
186. Id. at 1508-09.
187. Id. at 1511.
188. Id. at 1509. The court found scientific opinions supported the plaintiff's claim of potential
harm after a sufficient level of exposure. Id. at 1505-07.
189. Id. at 1509.
190. McKinney v. Anderson, 924 F.2d 1500 (1991) (decided on February 1, 1991); Helling v.
McKinney, 112 S. Ct. 291 (1991) (certiorari was granted October 15, 1991).
191. 112 S. Ct. 291 (1991).
192. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991). Wilson held deliberate indifference was required as a subjective
element in eighth amendment claims, particularly those which alleged inhumane conditions of
confinement. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text (discussing Wilson's extension of the
Estelle standard).
193. McKinney v. Anderson, 959 F.2d 853, 854 (9th Cir. 1992).
194. Id.
195. Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2479 (1993). The split involved a conflict between
the Ninth Circuit in McKinney v. Anderson, 959 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1992) (objectively inquiring
whether the prisoner was subjected to an unreasonable risk) and a Tenth Circuit opinion in Clem-
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time.196 In an opinion authored by Justice Byron White, the Court
reassessed the prisoner's claim and found that the proper inquiry
was whether the prisoner had met both subjective and objective ele-
ments of proof.1 97
Six justices joined Justice White's opinion, which, after a review
of the facts and a terse dismissal of an assertion against jurisdiction,
briefly summarized the present scope of the Eighth Amendment
punishment clause.1 98 In its opinion, the Court found that the pun-
ishment clause applied to a prisoner's treatment in prison, as well as
to the conditions of the prisoner's confinement; a fact which it
claimed was "undisputed."" Underlying this undisputed fact was
the state's affirmative duty toward its prisoners to care for those
who cannot care for themselves.200 A breach of this duty, and thus a
violation of the Eighth Amendment, occurred whenever a prison of-
ficial was deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical
needs. 20 1 The Court further held the deliberate indifference standard
applied equally to both treatment cases and condition cases.20
The defendants did not challenge the application of the deliberate
indifference standard. Instead, they argued that the requisite "seri-
ous medical needs" could arise only upon a prisoner's current suffer-
ing, and not upon threats of future harm. 03 The Court quickly re-
jected this distinction by listing several analogous situations in
which the risk of harm would itself be sufficient, 04 including in-
stances of infectious or contagious diseases in close quarters, 05 un-
mons v. Bohannon, 956 F.2d 1523 (10th Cir. 1992) (requiring an objective inquiry of whether
prisoner's harm was sufficiently serious).
196. Helling v. McKinney, 112 S. Ct. 3024 (1992) (granting certiorari).
197. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2475-82. Justice White retired shortly after this opinion was issued.
198. Defendants argued that because plaintiff's original complaint did not explicitly raise the
issues of degree of exposure and potential health effects, the appellate court improperly considered
these issues. Id. at 2479 (citing Pet. for Cert. 25-29). The court chose to address these issues
because they were the questions on which certiorari was granted. Id.
199. Id. at 2480. But see the dissent's apparent dispute of this summary, id. at 2482-85
(Thomas, J., dissenting), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 218-38. Arguably, though,
"undisputed" refers here to the petitioner's brief, which does not challenge these general tenets.
See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 177.
200. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2480, (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Serv.,
489 U.S. 189 (1989)).
201. Id. (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).
202. Id. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, Ill S. Ct. 2321 (1991)).
203. Id.; see also Petitioner's Brief, supra note 177, at *14.
204. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2480.
205. Id. at 2480-81. The Court generally objected to dangerous conditions created by the pres-
ence of communicable disease and specifically cited to Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978)
(enjoining crowded cells in which the risk of hepatitis and venereal disease exists) and Gates v.
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safe drinking water 0 6 and life-threatening utility hazards.20° With-
out commitment, the Court noted an argument by an amicus curiae
that not all risks would be "sufficiently grave" or would cause
"proximate harm. '2 0 8 However, while not precluding a future con-
sideration of these suggestions, the Court held it would be prema-
ture in this case to rule on the degree of a risk.0 9
Although the Court would not consider the degree of a harm's
risk, the Court considered and ruled on the issue of degree of the
harm itself.210 As part of the objective standard of proof, the Court
held that the level of harmful exposure is a necessary element of an
Eighth Amendment claim. 211 Thus, in addition to showing deliber-
ate indifference, the prisoner complaining of second-hand smoke
also had to show a level of exposure so unreasonably high that it
violated contemporary standards of decency.2"2 Although this essen-
tially reflected the appellate court's directions,21 3 the Supreme Court
revised the appellate court's description of the objective standard by
requiring more than a statistical, scientific inquiry. 1 4
To satisfy both the objective and subjective standards, the Court
further required current observations of what was being claimed -
in other words, the punisher's indifference and prisoner's exposure to
harm had to be ongoing. 2' The court realized that this would make
the plaintiff's case difficult, particularly because prison officials had
moved the prisoner away from the high levels of the initial smoke
exposure,216 and because the realities of prison administration seri-
Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1300 (5th Cir. 1974) (objecting to "the mingling of inmates with serious
contagious diseases").
206. Id. at 2480 (speculating on the viability of such a claim without having to wait for an
attack of dysentery).
207. Id. at 2481 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) which held that subjecting
prisoners to unsafe conditions is cruel and unusual punishment).
208. Id. (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19).
209. Id. ("We cannot rule at this juncture that it will be impossible for McKinney . ..to
prove an Eight Amendment violation based on exposure to ETS.").
210. Id. at 2481-82.
211. Id. at 2482.
212. Id. at 2481-82. The Court also indicated that it would consider what society would find
indecent as applied to anyone, not just prisoners. Id.
213. See supra notes 184-94 and accompanying text (noting the appellate court's acknowledge-
ment of the subjective standard and continued call for objective proof).
214. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2482.
215. Id.
216. Id.; see supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text (explaining the changing situation of
the prisoner while this case was being litigated).
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ously limit the plaintiffs ability to prove his case. 17
Two justices dissented, claiming that the seven justice majority
had overly expanded the Eighth Amendment. 18 In an opinion writ-
ten by Justice Clarence Thomas 21 9 and joined by Justice Antonin
Scalia,220 the dissent centered its contentions almost exclusively on
the past and present meanings of punishment. 221 Turning to diction-
aries spanning from 1771 to 1828,22 the dissent first derived a gen-
eral meaning for "punishment" as the Eighth Amendment framers
understood it.223  The definitions varied among the five sources
cited, 224 but the dissent constructed a general summary: punishment
was "the penalty imposed for the commission of a crime. ' 225 From
this, the dissent concluded that "judges or juries - but not jailers --
impose 'punishment.' "226 The original intent of the framers con-
tained no other meaning, the dissent argued, as the framers were
responding strictly to sentencing and legislative abuses.227 It noted
that while one state did express an early concern for prison condi-
tions in its own constitution,228 that concern merely supplemented
the state's reference to punishment, and thus did not change "the
217. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2482.
218. Id. at 2482-85 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 2482. Justice Thomas also dissented in Hudson v. McMillian, the last Supreme
Court case before Helling to analyze the punishment clause, and the only previous punishment
case considered while Justice Thomas was a member of the Court. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1004
(1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
220. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2482. Justice Scalia also joined Justice Thomas's Hudson dissent.
Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1004. In addition, Scalia authored a plurality opinion in Harmelin v. Mich-
igan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (permitting mandatory life imprisonment for a drug offense and
arguing for a traditional interpretation of the punishment clause) and the majority opinion in
Wilson v. Seiter, Ill S. Ct. 2321 (1991) (limiting the deliberate indifference standard to specific
conditions of confinement).
221. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2483-84.
222. Id. at 2483 (citing 2 T. CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAw-DICTIONARY (1771);
2 T. SHERIDAN, A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1780); J. WALKER, A
CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY (1791); 4 G. JACOB, THE LAW DICTIONARY: EXPLAINING
THE RISE. PROGRESS, AND PRESENT STATE, OF THE ENGLISH LAW (1811); and 2 N. WEBSTER,
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
223. Id.
224. All definitions related punishment to either crime or illegal transgression, but two particu-
larly described the act of punishment as a "penalty"; two as an "infliction imposed in vengeance";
and one as "any pain or suffering inflicted" Id. (citations omitted).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 2484.
227. Id. at 2483 (citing to Harmelin v. Michigan, Ill S. Ct. 2680, 2686 (1991) which suggests
that the 1689 English Declaration of Rights was strictly a response to sentencing abuses, and to 2
J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 111 (2d ed. 1854) which suggests a bar on
Congress from inventing and annexing cruel and unheard of punishments).
228. Id. at 2483-84 (citing the DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS. art. I, § XI (1792)).
240 [Vol. 44:215
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ordinary meaning of the word." 2 9
With support from an authoritative 1990 definition, 80 the dissent
concluded that punishment should mean today what it has "always
meant."2 31 Summarily tracing historical precedent, the dissent noted
that the Supreme Court did not reach conditions of confinement is-
sues until 185 years after the Eighth Amendment was ratified. 22
Even when the issue was finally raised and decided in Estelle v.
Gamble,"3' the Court failed to analyze or even extensively discuss
the text, relying only on the assertions of lower courts.23 Thus, Es-
telle may have been wrongly decided; the dissenters may have been
intimated, suggesting that they might one day vote to overrule it.235
For now, though, they would reject any extension beyond Estelle's
"serious injury" requirement 2 3 6 accepting neither the Hudson v.
McMillian extension to "minor injuries ' 211 nor the present exten-
sion to what was perceived by the dissenting justices as the "mere
risk of injury. 238
III. ANALYSIS
The Helling decision presents an interesting vantage point from
which to see how, over the course of time, the Supreme Court has
given distinct dimensions of meaning to the Eighth Amendment
punishment clause. On a fundamental level, the Court has either
expressed or implied an elementary dimension of meaning by pro-
ducing separate definitions for the key terms of the clause.239 More
recently, the Court has shaped the meaning of the clause according
to a second dimension, bound by particular objective and subjective
229. Id.
230. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (6th ed. 1990) which defines punishment as a
"fine, penalty, or confinement inflicted upon a person by the authority of the law and the judg-
ment and sentence of a court, for some crime or offense committed by him").
231. Id. According to the dissent, this definition "does not encompass a prisoner's injuries that
bear no relation to his sentence." Id.
232. Id. at 2484.
233. 429 U.S. 97 (1976); see also supra notes 117-26 and accompanying text (discussing the
Estelle decision).
234. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2484-85.
235. Id. at 2485.
236. Id. (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107-08).
237. Id. (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1005 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting and
adopting a lower court's conclusion that the injuries were "minor")).
238. Id. at 2482, 2485.
239. See infra notes 246-301 and accompanying text (summarizing and analyzing definitive
interpretations by the Supreme Court).
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standards of inquiry.240 Within a third dimension, the Court has
occasionally assigned meaning to the clause as a whole."4 These
dimensions of meaning have frequently overlapped, and in some
cases the Court's construction of the clause appears to have been
truly three-dimensional.242
In both the majority and dissenting opinions of Helling v. McKin-
ney,2"" however, the Supreme Court justices have clearly favored a
one-dimensional approach. In the majority opinion, seven justices
joined to focus only on particular standards of inquiry, to the exclu-
sion of term definitions or an overall interpretation of the clause.2"
By contrast, the two dissenters called for the definition of one word,
"punishment," without consideration of standards or overall mean-
ing.245 As a result, all nine justices have chosen to name "parts" of
the punishment clause without regard to its meaning as a whole.
Each of these partial methods of construction has promoted an un-
derstanding of the punishment clause which is static, narrow and
incomplete.
A. Dimensions of Meaning
Before critiquing the Supreme Court's most recent constructions
of the punishment clause in Helling v. McKinney, it is helpful to
review and then analyze the range of meaning the Court has as-
signed to the clause in each of its dimensions of construction, includ-
ing the range of elementary definitions, standards of inquiry, and
overall interpretations. In each of these dimensions, it is clear that
an absolute meaning for the punishment clause has been constantly
elusive.
1. Elementary Definitions
The four main terms of the punishment clause are "cruel," "un-
240. See infra notes 302-36 and accompanying text (summarizing and analyzing the Supreme
Court's use of standards).
241. See infra notes 337-54 and accompanying text (summarizing and analyzing overall
interpretations).
242. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), are examples of relatively three-dimensional cases which, although
not absolutely balanced, are not as top-sided as other cases seem.
243. 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993).
244. See infra notes 361-71 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's myopia).
245. See infra notes 372-88 and accompanying text (discussing the dissent's myopia).
[Vol. 44:215
PUNISHMENT CLAUSE
usual," "punishment," and "inflicted. ' 246 Two other terms might
also warrant definition because of their conspicuous absence: the
subject of the clause's prohibition and the indirect object of the
clause's protection.247
The word "cruel" was first defined explicitly by the Court in In re
Kemmler.2 48 The Kemmler Court declared, "Punishments are cruel
when they involve torture or a lingering death . . . something inhu-
mane and barbarous, something more than mere extinguishment of
life."'2 49 Nineteen years later, the Court in Weems v. United
States25 ° noted that "there could be exercises of cruelty by laws
other than those which inflicted bodily pain or mutilation."25 1
Weems also equated cruelty with a punishment's "excess of impris-
onment and that which accompanies and follows imprisonment."2 5
The Court explained that punishment might be excessive if its de-
gree reached beyond penal purposes or if it was disproportionate to
the crime.25 3 Legitimate penal purposes included repression of crime
and reformation of the criminal.254 Thus, punishment without a le-
gitimate purpose was "cruel. ' 255 Following Weems, a plurality in
Trop v. Dulles 56 further inferred punishment could be "cruel" even
in the absence of physical mistreatment if it involved "total destruc-
tion of ...status" or "primitive torture," with such a threat of
disastrous consequence as to make the punishment "obnoxious." 2 57
The word "unusual" was first implicitly linked to punishments
that were "unnecessary,"258 or not commonly occurring.2 59 The
246. U.S. CONST., amend. VIII.
247. The directive "cruel and unusual punishment [shall not be] inflicted" does not specify a
subject (who shall not?) nor an indirect object (inflicted upon whom?).
248. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
249. Id. at 447.
250. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
251. Id. at 372.
252. Id. at 377. The Weems dissent defined cruel as being more than severe, but consisting of
"unnecessary bodily suffering through a resort to inhumane methods for causing bodily torture."
Id. at 409 (White, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 376-82.
254. Id. at 381; see also Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991) (recognizing the purposes of
disciplinary chastisement and deterrence).
255. Weems, 217 U.S. at 381.
256. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
257. Id. at 101-03.
258. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) (referring to "unnecessary cruelty").
Wilkerson's use of "unnecessary" to qualify cruelty made the term implicitly distinct from
"cruel." Thus, "unnecessary" may be attached here to "unusual," the only other descriptive term
of the punishment clause. But see the dissent in Weems, 217 U.S. at 409 (White, J., dissenting)
(equating cruelty with "unnecessary bodily suffering").
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Court did not expressly attempt to define this term further until
Weems v. United States,26 in which punishment was considered un-
usual according to its character or kind. 6' Later, Trop v. Dulles 26 2
explicitly defined unusual as "something different from that which is
generally done. '263 More recently, in Harmelin v. Michigan,26" a
two justice plurality quoted from past and present dictionaries, hold-
ing that unusual meant in the early nineteenth century what it
means today, "'such as [does not] occu[r] in ordinary practice.' "265
The word "punishment," carefully defined by the dissent in Hel-
26ling v. McKinney, was not expressly considered until Trop v. Dul-
les.267 The Trop plurality, purporting to consider "punishment"
apart from considerations of cruelty and unusualness, concluded
punishment was defined by an act's purpose and fundamental na-
ture, but not by its effect. 268 Legislative acts were penal if that was
the legislator's intended purpose.269 On the other hand, an act could
be "penal in nature" 210 regardless of whether lawmakers attached a
penal label to the act.2 7 1 Twenty three years later, in Rhodes v.
259. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1890) (considering electrocution as a new
mode of death penalty).
260. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
261. Id. at 377-82. The Weems dissent defined unusual more specifically, linking the word to a
punishment's degree, mode, kind and extent. Id. at 409-10.
262. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
263. Id. at 100-01 n.32.
264. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
265. Id. at 2691 (quoting WEBSTER's DICTIONARY (1828)).
After Trop, the Court's attention to standards began to effectively replace contemporary defini-
tions of "cruel" and "unusual." One may infer from this replacement that a punishment was
implicitly deemed unusual if it was objectively serious or unreasonable by contemporary stan-
dards. See supra notes 154-67 and accompanying text (discussing the objective seriousness stan-
dard), and notes 142-153 and accompanying text (discussing the development of contemporary
standards measured by objective indicia). Likewise, a punishment was considered cruel if it was
"wanton" or subjected with "deliberate indifference." See supra note 115 and accompanying text
(discussing the development of the "unnecessary and wanton" standard), and notes 121-24 and
accompanying text (discussing the introduction of the deliberate indifference standard). On the
other hand, in Wilson v. Seiter, the Court declared the deliberative intent of a prison official to be
an integral part of the meaning of "punishment." 11 S. Ct. 2321, 2324-25 (1991).
266. See supra notes 224-29 and accompanying text (considering five dictionary definitions of
punishment).
267. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
268. Id. at 97-98.
269. Id. at 96-98.
270. Id. at 97.
271. Id. at 97-99. Trop considered the character, or "nature," of a denationalization law to
determine whether the law was part of a prisoner's "punishment." Id. However, Weems related
character to the term unusual. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377 (1910). Moreover,
Trop's focus on penal purposes is similar to Weems' relation of "cruel" to punishments that ex-
244
1994] PUNISHMENT CLAUSE
Chapman,2"2 the Court applied Trop's considerations of "purpose"
and "character," or "nature," by excusing harsh prison conditions
that were an intentional "part of the penalty. ' 27 3 Similarly, in a
274 Corlater opinion, the Court excepted harmful treatment that "pur-
port[ed] to be punishment. 27 8 In 1992, the Court, in Hudson
v.McMillian,7 8 inferred that punishment included, at least in part,
the discomfort which society expected prisoners to endure.2 7
The Court has never expressly defined "inflicted" in punishment
clause cases. However, the word has independent importance, as is
apparent in Helling v. McKinney's2 78 consideration of the harms or
threats of harm which an infliction might cause.2 79 Often, the Court
has implied that an infliction has not occurred unless some amount
of physical harm has occurred. 80 On the other hand, the Court has
suggested in a number of cases that an infliction might occur with-
out current bodily suffering.281
Consideration of the word "inflicted" also draws attention to the
open ends of the punishment clause. 82 While the Court has occa-
sionally considered the questions of whose infliction warrants scru-
tiny, and upon whom, it has typically done so without direct refer-
ence to the Eighth Amendment's terms.283 As a result, its answers
are not always consistent with one another. On the issue of who may
tend beyond penal purposes. Id. It may be argued, then, that Trop does not really consider the
term punishment without its qualifiers. If this is so, few, if any, Supreme Court cases have defined
"punishment" except by its contextual cruelty or unusualness.
272. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
273. Id. at 347.
274. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
275. Id. at 319.
276. 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
277. Id. at 1000.
278. 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993).
279. See supra notes 203-09 and accompanying text (discussing instances in which the punish-
ment clause would protect against the risk of harm without any current suffering).
280. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000 (1992) (distinguishing between "mi-
nor" and "serious" injuries).
281. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (acknowledging that subjecting pris-
oners to unsafe conditions is cruel and unusual punishment); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678
(1978) (enjoining crowded cells in which the risk of hepatitis and venereal disease exists); Gates v.
Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974)(objecting to the mingling of inmates with serious, conta-
gious diseases).
282. See supra text accompanying notes 299-301 (explaining how definitions of the clause's
terms vary depending upon the court applying them).
283. See e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130
(1878); Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. 475 (1866); see also supra notes 72-81 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Wilson's "trust" argument, which does not intrinsically consider the
clauses's possible breadth).
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be said to inflict an Eighth Amendment punishment, the Court has
gradually applied a liberal construction, originally limiting the
clause to judicial inflictions, 84 but later extending its application to
legislative inflictions,2 8 and finally allowing review of administrative
inflictions.2 86 However, on the issue of who may be said to suffer an
Eighth Amendment infliction, the Court has not been as expansive.
Review has been rigidly limited to convicted prisoners,287 specifically
excluding prisoners awaiting conviction or acquittal, 88 involuntarily
committed mental patients, 89 wards of the state2 90 and corporally
punished school children.291
Giving meaning to the punishment clause strictly by considering
elementary definitions may have inherent shortcomings. Particular
term definitions have never been truly definitive for all applications
and have often required considerations in context. Punishment, for
instance, has been identified according to a prison official's intent in
some cases 92 and society's expectations in others. 93 Unusual has
ranged in meaning from unnecessary294 to uncommon. 295 Synony-
mous meanings of cruel ranged from torturous 296 to lingering 29 7 to
wanton to deliberately indifferent. 98
At the same time, arriving at the punishment clause's meaning
without considering the meaning of its parts can cause a critical
284. See Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. 475 (1866) (refusing to extend Eighth Amendment
protection to state legislation).
285. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
286. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
287. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977).
288. Id.
289. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 325 (1982).
290. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 199 n.6 (1989).
DeShaney does suggest that the deliberate indifference standard was relevant to establishing the
standard of care a state owes its wards, but the Court did not actually apply the Eighth Amend-
ment in this case. Id. at 198.
291. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 670.
292. See Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991) (finding a prison official's deliberative intent
to be an integral part of the meaning of "punishment"); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96-98
(1958) (defining punishment according to its purpose rather than its label).
293. Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000 (1992) (discussing societies expectations and
citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) which describes a prisoner's routine discom-
forts as the price society expected the prisoner to pay).
294. See supra note 258 (discussing the use of "unnecessary" in Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S.
130 (1878)).
295. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1890).
296. Id. at 447.
297. Id.
298. See supra note 265 (noting an implicit relationship between "cruel" and the Court's appli-
cations of a subjective standard).
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oversight. For example, while the Court has fairly grappled, at least
implicitly, with definitions of some of the punishment clause's
terms, 99 it has devoted disproportionate discussion to other parts of
the clause, such as the scope of its verb (inflict) or the identities of
its implied subject (the inflictor) and indirect object (the in-
flictee).300 While each of these terms has occasionally been dis-
cussed,30 1 the terms' meanings have not been as carefully defined as
other elements, which may lead to unfair presumptions.
2. Standards of Inquiry
For the last thirty five years, the Supreme Court has applied, in
place of term definitions, explicit standards of objective 2 and sub-
jective inquiry 303 to punishment clause cases. However, as with its
definitions of terms, the Court's application of this second dimension
of construction has been inconsistent. In addition, these standards of
inquiry may not fairly incorporate the meaning of all the terms or
the punishment clause as a whole.
The objective standard was first pronounced in plural form, with-
out any subjective accompaniment, as "evolving standards of de-
cency" in Trop v. Dulles.04 "Decency," according to the plurality,
was marked by society's progressive maturity.305 In Robinson v.
California,306 the evolving standards were to be measured "in the
light of contemporary human knowledge."310 In Furman v. Geor-
gia,30 8 one justice considered the meaning of the punishment clause
to fluctuate "as public opinion changed." 30 9 In Estelle v. Gamble,3 10
the Court again returned to "decency" as the standards' anchor, but
299. See supra notes 246-81 and accompanying text (illustrating the attempt to define the
clause's terms).
300. See supra notes 282-91 and accompanying text (discussing the attention given to these
"open ends" of the punishment clause).
301. See supra notes 248-98 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 142-67 and accompanying text (following the development of objective
standards since their 1958 introduction).
303. See supra notes 121-41 and accompanying text (following the development of subjective
standards since they were introduced in 1976).
304. 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
305. Id. ("The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.").
306. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
307. Id. at 666.
308. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
309. Id. at 329 n.37 (Marshall, J., concurring).
310. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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now decency secured "contemporary standards . . . manifested in
modern legislation." 1 1
If "decency" was the anchor, then the yardstick, according to a
plurality in Gregg v. Georgia,3 12 was the "objective indicia" of pub-
lic attitudes.3 13 The yardstick holders were lawmakers, "  jurors, "
and, later, prison officials.318 In 1977, the Court declared it would
defer "to the maximum possible extent" to these measurers. 1 How-
ever, within four years, the Court twice set aside its rule of defer-
ence in cases in which it considered objective severity,31 8 or the lack
thereof, 19 apparent. By 1991, the Court was methodically allowing
judicial objectivity inquiries as to whether deprivations were "suffi-
ciently serious."3 20 In 1992, the Court said its objective standards
were contextual, measurable by considerations of extreme serious-
ness in some cases21 and excessive force in others.3 22
Objective standards, identified by Trop v. Dulles' "evolving stan-
dards of decency," were the Court's only application of inquiry
guidelines for eighteen years,323 until a plurality declared, again in
Gregg v. Georgia,"" that courts should also make a subjective judg-
ment about whether a punishment was "excessive. 3 8  This inquiry
considered whether a penalty matched the relative severity of the
crime;328 alternatively, it could ask whether an infliction of pain was
311. Id. at 103.
312. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
313. Id. at 173.
314. Id. at 174-75, 181-82.
315. Id. at 181-82.
316. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1986); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
349 n.14, 352 (1981); Bell v, Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979); see also notes 152-53 and
accompanying text (discussing the deference to prison officials).
317. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion). This opinion was cited
with approval by a majority in Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980).
318. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978) (holding a court could consider severity in
assessing a prison conditions claim).
319. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347-48 (rejecting a prison conditions claim because there were no
intolerable conditions).
320. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991).
321. Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000 (1992) (requiring extreme deprivations in
prison condition cases).
322. Id. (requiring excessive force, as opposed to a significant injury, in a claim against a prison
guard's official use of force).
323. 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The standard set forth in 1958 by the Trop plurality was not
significantly altered until 1976 in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
324. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
325. Id. at 173.
326. Id.
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"unnecessary and wanton. ' 327 Four months later, in Estelle v. Gam-
ble, 28 a majority of the Court restated the Gregg plurality's general
"unnecessary and wanton" requirement as specifically involving "de-
liberate indifference to serious medical needs" in the case of prison
deprivations. 29 The following year, however, the Court indicated
that the proper inquiry in prison condition cases was only the unnec-
essary and wanton infliction of pain.3"' The Court later returned to
the deliberate indifference standard for all cases involving a single,
identifiable deprivation.3 3' Thus, in eighteen years of the subjective
inquiry's existence, the definition of the standard changed three
times.
Neither the objective nor the subjective standards of review have
been consistently defined by the Court. For its objective standards,
the Court has inconsistently designated measuring "indicia"332 and
irregularly applied such terms as "serious" and "excessive" in its
objective inquiry.333 The Court has also used the words "excessive"
and "serious" in defining its subjective standards,334 and has flip-
flopped on the suitableness of a "deliberate indifference" inquiry.3 85
With these inconsistencies, construing the punishment clause strictly
by applying objective and subjective standards of review is clearly
problematic. Those who are potentially liable for violating the pun-
ishment clause have no guidance on how to conduct themselves.
Those who are potential victims, meanwhile, will have a diminished
reason to seek the protection the Constitution might provide them.
Another problem with the standards of objectivity and subjectiv-
ity is that they may not sufficiently reflect the meaning of the pun-
ishment clause or of its terms . 3  For instance, an exclusive concen-
327. Id.
328. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
329. Id. at 104.
330. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977).
331. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2327 (1991).
332. See supra notes 304-22 and accompanying text (discussing the various "yardsticks" used).
333. See supra notes 160-67 and accompanying text (noting the distinctions made in Hudson v.
McMillian). The Hudson Court considered the measures of seriousness and excessiveness to be
objective elements which were responsive to contemporary standards of decency. Hudson v.
McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000 (1992).
334. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (introducing as a subjective inquiry the
"deliberate indifference to serious medical needs"); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173-76
(1976) (defining a subjective inquiry of excessiveness).
335. See supra notes 323-31 (noting the Court's "deliberate indifference" flip-flop over 18
years' time).
336. See supra notes 111-67 (discussing the objective and subjective standards of proof).
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tration on objective seriousness and a subjective state of mind may
find fault with a punishment that is not unusual by society's stan-
dards. Alternatively, by looking for gross indecency and excessive-
ness, aggregate cruelties may be unjustly excused or unfairly diffi-
cult to prove.
3. Overall Interpretations.
The irony of the Supreme Court's complex development of parti-
tioned standards of inquiry is that these standards originated from
simple guidances which were clearly meant to be applied to the
clause's overall construction: Trop v. Dulles' evolving standards of
decency required, very generally, the law to reflect a "maturing so-
ciety"; 337 before that, Weems v. United States called broadly for
punishment considerations not "only of what has been, but of what
may be.""38 These exemplify overall understandings of the punish-
ment clause, a third dimension of construction which strives not only
to contemplate the forest of the clause's meaning, but also to appre-
ciate its vitality.
For one hundred years, the Supreme Court reviewed punishment
clause claims on an ad hoc basis, refusing to give the punishment
clause an "exact meaning."33 9 In this regard, the Weems Court was
not unprecedented when it did not fix the meaning of the clause, 40
nor was it the first to recognize that the words of the clause were
not precise. 341 However, Weems was the first Supreme Court case to
give the clause clear vitality, by providing it with a practical overall
meaning; the punishment clause was more than an admonition, it
was meant to be a check on the abuse of power by all branches of
337. 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
338. 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). The Weems Court also found, in language similar to Trop, that
the punishment clause "may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane
justice." Id. at 378.
339. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878) (declining to give the clause an exact
meaning but ruling ad hoc on the case presented); see also Weems, 217 U.S. at 369 ("No case has
occurred in this court which has called for an exhaustive definition.").
In fact, it was after more than 175 years, with the arrival of standards of inquiry in Weems v.
United States, that the Court first started to methodically assign exacting definitions to the pun-
ishment clause. Id.
340. Id. at 376-77.
341. According to the Trop plurality, Weems recognized ...that the words of the Amend-
ment are not precise." 356 U.S. at 100-01. However, Weems itself noted that, despite the Court
having several occasions of review, "[w]hat constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment has not
been exactly decided." 217 U.S. at 368.
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government.342 The Trop v. Dulles plurality 4 3 later continued this
argument, asserting that the punishment clause was not merely good
advice but a rule of government intended to be applied.344
Unfortunately, in applying this rule, the Court has assigned
meanings that have moved, in the course of time, from flexible to
fixed. For example, the Trop opinion generally noted that the words
"cruel and unusual" could be construed as reflecting a "basic prohi-
bition against inhumane treatment," apart from the distinct mean-
ings of parts of the clause. 45 Trop also considered that human dig-
nity was "[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment. 346 In Gregg v. Georgia,47 a plurality relied on Trop
v. Dulles' "basic" understanding of dignity to establish its more par-
ticular "excessiveness inquiry. '"348 Later, in Hudson v. McMil-
lian,349 a majority of the Court held the "core judicial inquiry" in
excessive use of disciplinary force cases was whether a prison guard
acted maliciously or sadistically.350
As with the other dimensions of punishment clause construction,
overall interpretations are not infallible. In one extreme, they may
be reduced to rigid standards of diminished practicality;3 51 in the
other extreme, they may be applied without duly considering the
elementary meanings of the clause's parts.352 For the above reasons,
definitions and standards should always supplement and balance an
overall construction, or such construction will be of little use.
On the other hand, a fundamental interpretation can add consis-
tency to dual standards or particular definitions that might not oth-
erwise be there. A general construction, whether it is centered on an
instruction to be "progressive" 3 53 or a reminder to consider "dig-
342. Weems, 217 U.S. at 376.
343. 356 U.S. 86 (1957).
344. Id. at 103-04.
345. Id. at 100-01 n.32.
346. Id. at 100.
347. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
348. Id. at 173.
349. 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
350. Id. at 999.
351. Arguably, this is what has happened since Weems and Trop. See supra text accompanying
notes 304-38 (discussing the development of standards of inquiries).
352. This has also happened since the earlier cases. Cf. Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349 (1910)
(providing particular definitions alongside its general call for progressiveness) with any of the
post-Trop cases.
353. Weems, 217 U.S. at 378.
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nity," 54 guides judges, punishers and the punished in a way that
ensures the Eighth Amendment punishment clause will not become
static yet will always have practical meaning.
B. Constructions in Helling v. McKinney
The Supreme Court delivered majority and dissenting opinions in
Helling v. McKinney 55 after six years of litigation,3 6 with two
rounds of arguments before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,"'1
and two rounds of arguments before the Supreme Court."
Throughout this odyssey, the question presented to the judiciary re-
mained the same: what does it take to implicate and prove six words
of the Constitution? Arguably, the question remains unanswered.
The majority in Helling declared that the proof depended upon
dual standards of inquiry.359 These standards apparently combined
to exclusively restate the punishment clause's six words in absolute
terms. The dissent argued that the proof turned dispositively on an
exact definition of only one of the words: punishment. 60 The other
terms were apparently secondary. By focusing on these exclusive
and particular understandings of the punishment clause, both the
majority and the dissent in Helling disregarded significant parts of
the clause and detracted from the meaning of the clause as a whole.
1. Proof by Dual Standards
The Helling majority's holding, reduced to a single rule, required
a prisoner claiming a wrongful prison condition to show deliberate
indifference of prison officials towards the exposure of the prisoner
to an unreasonably grave risk of harm.36 1 The indifference compo-
nent was subjective, and was to be measured in light of the prison
officials' present conduct and attitudes;3 62 the unreasonable risk
component was objective, and was to be measured by contemporary
354. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
355. 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993).
356. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
357. McKinney v. Anderson, 924 F.2d 1500 (9th Cir. 1991); McKinney v. Anderson, 959 F.2d
853 (9th Cir. 1992).
358. The Supreme Court initially remanded the case in 1991 for application of the Wilson
standards. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991). The case came before the Court a second
time in 1993. Helling, 113 S. Ct. 2475.
359. 113 S. Ct. at 2475-82.
360. Id. at 2482-85.
361. Id. at 2481-82.
362. Id. at 2482.
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standards of decency.363
The majority never strayed far from its dual standard discussion,
although it did elaborate on these standards. 64 Most significantly,
the Court explained that deliberate indifference may exist with re-
gard not only to current health and safety problems but also where
there is needless suffering that is certain or very likely to cause seri-
ous health problems, even if there are no prevailing symptoms.86 5
On the other hand, deliberate indifference had to be reflected in the
authorities' current attitudes and conduct, and was limited by "the
realities of prison administration. '" 366
The Court also explained that an unreasonable risk required an
unwilling exposure to harm that today's society would not tolerate
and would find indecent when applied to anyone, not just prison-
ers. 6 7 However, a prisoner must show actual, current exposure to
himself or herself.3 68
Throughout its opinion, the majority constantly remained more
concerned with formalistic proof than with a comprehensive under-
standing of the punishment clause. Beyond the key words and
phrases of "deliberate indifference" and "contemporary standards,"
the majority limited its overall construction to adding an allowance
for present recognitions of future harms.6 9 The significance of this
new construction is questionable, however, as the "present recogni-
tions" requirement effectively negates the idea of "future harms," or
at least makes them difficult to prove. 70
As for the elementary text of the clause, the majority does at
least imply that prison officials may be deemed inflictors by their
indifference, and that prisoners may be inflicted by being exposed. 71
Nevertheless, there is no discussion of term definitions, leaving po-
tential inflictees, when applying the Court's standards to their vari-
ous circumstances, left to wonder: Am I being punished? Is the way
I am suffering unusual? At what point does my suffering become
cruel? And how can this be recognized as an infliction?
363. Id.
364. Id. at 2480-82.
365. Id. at 2480.
366. Id. at 2482.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 2480-82.
371. Id.
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2. Proof by Singular Definition
The dissent in Helling v. McKinney keenly noted the majority's
unasked questions, or at least one of them. 72 After agreeing, reluc-
tantly, that prison deprivations causing actual, serious injuries might
implicate the Eighth Amendment,3 73 but disagreeing that the rule of
Estelle v. Gamble374 should extend to "the mere threat of injury, 3 75
the dissent admonished both the majority and the authors of Estelle
for failing to analyze the text of the punishment clause, especially
the word punishment itself.37 6 Exhaustively, the dissent offered its
own consideration of what punishment should mean. 77 However, it
completely ignored the other words of the punishment clause, and
avoided any discussion of standards or overall construction. More-
over, even its singular definition of punishment can be criticized.
Punishment, according to the dissent, has "always meant"3 78 what
the most recent Black's Dictionary defines it to mean: a "fine, pen-
alty, or confinement inflicted upon a person by the authority of the
law and the judgment and sentence of a court, for some crime or
offense committed by him.13 7 9 Although the dissent supplemented
this definition with several others from history and case law,38 0 this
was presented as its express conclusion. Still, the dissent argued fur-
ther that "judges or juries - but not jailers - impose 'punish-
ment.' "381 This argument ignores what punishment has allegedly
"always meant." 3 2 It also disregards the word's use in context. Fi-
nally, the dissent's argument pretends that law and language can
never evolve.
First, the Black's definition of punishment does not exclude jailers
from imposing punishment, unless it is read to include only inflic-
tions imposed "by . . . the judgment and sentence of a court."3 8
The removed words are critical, however. In part, the more com-
372. Id. at 2484-85 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
373. Id. at 2485.
374. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
375. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2485 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
376. Id. at 2482-85.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 2483.
379. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (6th ed. 1990).
380. See supra notes 221-29 and accompanying text (noting some of the sources to which the
dissent turned).
381. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2484.
382. Id. at 2483.
383. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (6th ed. 1990).
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plete definition recognizes inflictions dealt "by the authority of...
the judgment and sentence of a court,"3"4 which should include
those who administer the judgment. Moreover, the administrators
themselves are not posited over the prisoners except "by the author-
ity of the law," which the dictionary definition also allows.388
Second, the word punishment must be considered in context,
alongside "cruel," "unusual," and "inflicted." The Black's definition
only considers punishment in the "usual" sense, when the legislature
and the judiciary condone it; it does not clearly extend to "unusual,"
unauthorized punishments, such as the acts of a vigilante who takes
the law into his or her own hands and claims the right to punish.
Moreover, punishment is not actually "inflicted" until after the sen-
tence has been imposed; courtroom determinations do not punish
nearly as much as the acts and omissions after the sentencing. 86
Indeed, more often it is what follows that can be most cruel to the
prisoner.
Ultimately, the word punishment, as with any word, should not be
considered to "always mean" anything, least of all what it meant at
one point two hundred years ago. This is precisely the static and
backwards glancing that the Weems and Trop opinions opposed, 87
and by arguing in favor of such static, the dissent merely reverts to
the fears of the framers, that the punishment clause may one day
become meaningless. 88
3. Proof by Comprehensive Construction
While neither the majority nor the dissenting opinion in Helling
v. McKinney strived to comprehensively construe the punishment
clause, the majority can at least be said to have advanced past de-
velopments of the clause's "standards," 8 9 and the dissent can be
said to have invited more careful considerations of the meaning of
"punishment." 9 ' Thus, despite the interpretive shortcomings of
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. See, e.g.. text accompanying note 162 (discussing the deprivations and discomforts prison-
ers are expected to endure as part of their punishment).
387. See supra notes 60-63, 92-95 and accompanying text (repeating lengthy arguments
presented in Weems and in Trop arguing for a constructive vitality).
388. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (recalling the questions from William
Smith and Samuel Livermore of the indefiniteness of the Eighth Amendment punishment clause).
389. Helling v. McKinney, 113 S.Ct 2475, 2475-82 (1993); see supra notes 210-17 (discussing
the majority standard).
390. Id. at 2482-85; see supra notes 222-238 and accompanying text (discussing the dissent's
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these two opinions, the Weems v. United States' call for non-static
interpretation 91 continues to be heeded by the Court, incidentally if
not intentionally.
However, while evolutionary interpretation includes an evolution
of the meaning of each part of the punishment clause, the clause as
applied must also be allowed to evolve as a whole. Both majority
and dissent, each by stubbornly insisting on myopic constructions of
the punishment clause, have hindered this process. It is true that
Helling has apparently extended the scope of the clause to include
serious risks as well as actual harms, but it remains to be seen how
practical this extension is, given the Court's prohibitive tolerance for
"the realities of prison administration," 9 ' its absolute requirement
of proving currently recognizable exposures, attitudes and con-
duct, 93 and its insistence on strict compliance with both stan-
dards.394 It may even turn out that Helling v. McKinney will dis-
courage prisoners' protections by the Eighth Amendment. It is clear,
however, that Helling will not be the last word on the punishment
clause, whose meaning, against all strictures, will undoubtedly con-
tinue to evolve.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Eighth Amendment punishment clause, with its six words
"nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted," has been a part of our
country's Constitution for over two hundred years. Standing as one
of the pillars in our foundation of law, the clause has prompted
many to seek a lasting meaning of these words. However, as with
much, if not all, of our Constitution, meaning can be assigned in
myriad ways. Individual words might be defined for all times, as the
dissenters in Helling v. McKinney proposed for the word "punish-
ment." Absolute standards of proof, shaped by case law, might be
proffered for a class of applications, as the Helling majority ordered
for prison condition cases.
But strict methods of construction cannot be the only means of
interpretation. Individual terms must be considered in context and
according to contemporary meaning. Standards must not stray away
definition of punishment).
391. 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
392. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2482.
393. Id.
394. Id.
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from individual term meaning, nor from any meaning the clause
might have as a whole. Ideally, term definitions, application stan-
dards, and overall understandings of the clause should add to one
another as complementary dimensions of construction. Finally, by
all means, the clause should not become too strictly construed or
statically understood but should be allowed to evolve, or, as several
framers feared, all meaning will be lost.
Jonathan A. Void

